summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/posts/2020-12-29-antivirus-software-is-a-hack.php
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'posts/2020-12-29-antivirus-software-is-a-hack.php')
-rw-r--r--posts/2020-12-29-antivirus-software-is-a-hack.php137
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/posts/2020-12-29-antivirus-software-is-a-hack.php b/posts/2020-12-29-antivirus-software-is-a-hack.php
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc5f0d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/posts/2020-12-29-antivirus-software-is-a-hack.php
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+<?php
+$title = "Antivirus Software is a Hack";
+if (isset($early) && $early) {
+ return;
+}
+include($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'] . '/includes/head.php');
+?>
+
+<p>
+ <img src="https://nextcloud.53hor.net/index.php/s/jJoFoA7Ppjb7rey/preview" />
+</p>
+
+<p class="description">
+ I read a really terrific article today about computer security and
+ really dumb ideas or trends that have developed in this field. It's
+ <a href="https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/">M. Ranum's <em>The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security</em></a>, and I highly recommend reading through the whole thing. It's got
+ great anecdotes and really simple language for what I consider to be
+ some of the obvious issues with the way programmers and sysadmins think
+ about security (myself included). One portion of it (idea #2), however,
+ finally put something into words that I've felt for a really long time.
+ It enables me to explain why I think all antivirus software is a total
+ hack and is virtually useless.
+</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+ hack<br />
+ 1. n. Originally, a quick job that produces what is needed, but not
+ well.
+ <br />
+ <cite>-- The Jargon File (version 4.4.7, 29 Dec 2003) [jargon]</cite>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>
+ This is the Jargon File's definition of a hack. And to me, this is what
+ antivirus software is. Antivirus software, as I understand it, emerged
+ in the mid to late 1980s and became prolific in the 1990s. In the 2000s
+ it was considered an essential piece of software and people were paying
+ for yearly subscriptions for antivirus suites from Norton, Avast, and
+ McAfee.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+ The most basic functionality of an antivirus program is to determine
+ whether malware exists on a host operating system. The typical method of
+ doing this is to use a collection of virus definitions and compare each
+ and every potentially-infected file with each and every definition to
+ determine whether the file is malware or has been infected by some. An
+ over-simplified way of implementing this is to store a collection of
+ hashes, each taken from a known potentially unwanted program or
+ infectious executable. You can then hash entire files or portions of
+ files and compare the checksums to see whether a file contains or is
+ equivalent to the definition, and is therefore infected and shouldn't be
+ executed. Some security suites go beyond this with heuristic matching,
+ but if you run an antivirus that has to "update definitions" on a
+ routine basis, it probably works something like this*. With any luck, it
+ does it without being a total detriment to system performance. Ideally
+ it also doesn't act like a piece of malware itself by making itself near
+ impossible to remove (looking at you, McAfee).
+</p>
+
+<p>
+ To me, a virus definition database is "enumerating badness" (Ranum's
+ Dumb Idea #2). The premise is that it is not only logical but even
+ possible to compile a list of <em>all</em> potentially unwanted
+ programs, viruses, ransomware, and worms. An environment of trust should
+ be built around the programs that you want to run (read:
+ <em>allow to run</em>), not the other way around. Picture an operating
+ system where no binary file can be executed unless it is specifically
+ flagged as being allowed to. Oh and picture also being able to restrict
+ this execution to just the file's owner, or other groups of users.
+ Wouldn't it be easier to store the list of 30 odd programs that you and
+ other system users trust to be run than the thousands (millions?) of
+ programs that are infectious, forbidden, or unwanted? What about when
+ those trusted applications become compromised? Would it not also be
+ easier to maintain a list of checksums for those binaries and compare
+ those checksums before they're executed to make sure they haven't been
+ infected or replaced?
+</p>
+
+<p>
+ The answer is yes, it would be easier. And yes, it is easier. Of course,
+ your system has to work that way. Antivirus software is a hack because
+ it's a hack-y solution to a problem that has a better, simpler solution.
+ It also has the potential for making a ton of money but I won't go into
+ that. It's easier to enumerate goodness, to specifically open up to a
+ select few trustworthy applications. Good lists are usually shorter than
+ bad lists. This builds on top of Ranum's Dumb Idea #1: Default Permit.
+ You wouldn't configure a firewall to just block some known bad ports and
+ traffic. You configure it to block all of it, and then whitelist the
+ ones you know you can trust. You wouldn't configure a browser ad-blocker
+ to permit all ads, and select the ones you don't want to see. You block
+ all of them! Then, if there are sites or ads you're okay with seeing,
+ you whitelist them. You shouldn't default permit all programs to be
+ given control over your computer, and then meticulously list the ones
+ that don't have that permission.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+ Oh and of course, as always, there's free software that lets you do
+ this. You don't have to pay for an antivirus suite, or even use an
+ unpaid one that slows down your computer or barrages you with ads. On
+ the BSDs and virtually all Linux distributions, there are built-in tools
+ to control access and execution of binaries. There are additional tools
+ that you can install that check whether binaries (in locations like
+ <code>/bin</code> or <code>/usr/local/bin</code> have been modified
+ since you last used them. On Windows, the story is a little different.
+ Most home Windows 10 users are automatically allowed to install and run
+ any software they want to by default. Windows Server does have Software
+ Restriction Policies that allow you to create a "default deny" policy
+ and whitelist only the software that's allowed to run. If you're using a
+ home edition you probably have to look for software that lets you do
+ this. I haven't tried any of them so I'm not going to endorse or even
+ name them here.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+ Preventing malware from running on your system is a problem. Solving
+ this problem is the right thing to do. But please, try to solve it the
+ right way. I stopped using an antivirus after I moved out and got to
+ control my own computer. I don't think it ever did me any good besides
+ flag false positives (a lot of the time with programs or applications
+ that I wrote, which weren't malicious in any way!) and grind my spinning
+ disk to a halt. Evaluate what software you use. Is most of it online?
+ Are there one or two applications that you know you need to use? How
+ often do you install and use unknown or untrusted software? Odds are you
+ can come up with a list of very few programs that you want or need to
+ use. If it's less than 100,000, you're probably better off with a
+ default deny policy than an antivirus suite.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+ * What I didn't mention here is that as soon as a new piece of malware
+ is constructed, if it's different enough from its predecessors, it's
+ impervious to all antivirus suites on the planet that don't have it in
+ their definitions. So until that malware is used, detected, and added to
+ the list, it has free reign.
+</p>